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Ⅲ . Challenges in Leveling ADR Playing Field:  
International Enforcement of  
Mediated Settlement Agreement
Sorawit LIMPARANGSRI*
 Alternative dispute resolution or ADR has played a significant role in dealing with 
various kinds of disputes. Its efﬁciency and effectiveness has been well noted, and embraced 
by parties. However, all means of dispute resolution mechanism are not created equal. Some 
mechanism is probably more equal than others. Such situation has long contributed to the 
vast gulf of disparity in adoption of some particular types of ADR, even though some 
mechanism left behind has great beneﬁts to parties.
 In arbitration, parties have long reaped the beneﬁts of having internationally recognized 
system for enforcing arbitral award. Its latest and most successful convention, i.e., the New 
York Convention 1 , has been in place since ₁₉₅₈. Under the system, parties can bring their 
arbitral awards to courts in more than ₁₅₀ jurisdictions, and ask those courts to enforce the 
awards against assets of the losing parties in the jurisdictions. Courts that receive such 
request are obliged to enforce the awards. Refusal to enforcement can be done only due to 
the speciﬁc and limited grounds 2  as provided in the convention. The most important thing 
in this regards is that the criteria applied by courts throughout the world are consistent in 
accordance with the standard provided in the convention. Parties can then have the peace of 
mind in realizing that the solution for their dispute will be enforced throughout the world as 
long as they comply with such single consistent criteria. It is not surprising to see that 
arbitration has become the dispute resolution mechanism of choice for parties in 
transnational transactions. 
 On the other hand, mediation, another ADR mechanism, has enjoyed far less 
*　Judge of Office of the President of the Supreme Court, Thailand; LL.B. (Hons.) Thammasat 
Universit; LL.M. (with distinction ＂Harlan Fisk Stone Scholar＂) Columbia University School of Law; 
LL.M. University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
1 　Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (₁₉₅₈).
2 　Id., Article V. 
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recognition and utilization in transnational disputes, notwithstanding the immense beneﬁts 
that it can bestow on the parties. To pinpoint a few of such beneﬁts, mediation can heal the 
rift between business partners through direct communication in non-confrontational manner 
guided by mediators. In mediation, parties can also seek mutual solution that all of them are 
satisfied with, or, at least, can live with. Despite such benefits, parties seldom select 
mediation as mechanism of choice in their dispute resolution clauses. One of the hindrances 
is the lack of enforcement mechanism, especially in the international arena. Currently, when 
a party wants to enforce the settlement agreement that is the outcome of mediation, the party 
has to initiate an ordinary lawsuit, just like when they want to enforce ordinary contracts. 
When courts in various jurisdictions have to entertain such requests, they have to apply their 
domestic criteria that may be greatly different from one another. Parties in the dispute will 
be effectively clueless in how to structure their settlement agreements to comply with such 
disparate criteria and standard. 
 Having recognized the unfortunate situation, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law or UNCITRAL 3  has decided to embark on the effort to create a 
new international instrument to address the impediment that parties in mediation confront in 
enforcing the settlement agreements that they have painstakingly worked on. It is hoped that 
once the project comes to the conclusion, there will be some kind of coherent criteria and 
standard in the enforcement of settlement agreements. However, to achieve such lofty goal, 
there are quite a number of challenges that we have to overcome. This article tries to 
identify such challenges, and offer a few thoughts on the matters, especially on why, at the 
other end of the tunnel, we should create a new convention similar to the New York 
Convention for enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, so that parties who prefer 
to solve their disputes by mutual consents can enjoy the same benefits as parties in 
arbitration. In having such new mechanism, the playing ﬁeld for mediation can then be at 
the same level as that of arbitration. The two ADR mechanisms will, from there on, operate 
on equal footing.  
3 　Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ₄₈th Session (₂₉ June – ₁₆ 
July ₂₀₁₅), A/₇₀/₁₇, available at http://www.uncitral/uncitral/commission/sessions/₄₈th.html.
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I. The Current Means for Dealing with the Enforcement of Settlement 
Agreements
 In case parties want their settlement agreements to have greater enforceability, they can 
transform the settlement agreement into an arbitral award on agreed-terms. In such case, the 
settlement agreements will be enforced in the same way as ordinary arbitral awards, and 
enjoy the beneﬁts of the New York Convention. 
 Some institution even creates innovative means to strengthen the tie between mediation 
and arbitration such as the mechanism called ＂arb-med-arb＂ 4 . Under the process, parties 
will ﬁrst commence an arbitral proceeding. The proceeding, however, will be paused, so that 
the parties can bring the dispute to mediation. If the mediation is successful, the parties will 
then bring the settlement agreement back to the paused arbitral proceeding, and continue 
with the procedure for achieving an award on agreed-terms. 
 The practices demonstrated that parties in mediation do need greater enforceability for 
their settlement agreement. Due to the lack of an international mechanism for enforcement 
of settlement agreements, they have to disguise their true intention to have their disputes 
settled by mediation, by using awards on agreed-terms as their camouﬂage. In other words, 
the parties just want to borrow the enforceability and the mechanism that the New York 
Convention has long been giving to parties in arbitration, even though they have no real will 
to use arbitration as such. 
 The mechanism, criteria and standard under the New York Convention, however, do 
not ﬁt nicely with the enforcement of settlement agreements, because they were drafted with 
arbitration and the arbitral proceeding in minds, not mediation and the settlement 
agreements. Therefore, some aspect of the New York Convention can only be awkwardly 
applied to mediation and settlement agreements. For example, among the criteria for refusal 
of enforcement under the New York Convention, courts may refuse to enforce arbitral 
awards if it is found that a party is not duly notified of the arbitral proceeding and the 
appointment of arbitrators 5 , or the arbitral award is beyond the scope of the underlying 
4 　SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb Protocol, available at http://simc.com.sg/siac-simc-arb-med-arb-
protocol.
5 　Supra note ₁, Article V(₁)(b).
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arbitration agreements 6 . Notiﬁcation of the proceeding and the appointment does not seem 
to be a relevant factor in mediation, because, regardless of the service of the notiﬁcation, 
parties have participated in the mediation, and negotiated the terms of the settlement 
agreements themselves. Moreover, although disputes may arise from a contract, and parties 
bring particular disputes to mediation, they are totally free to discuss any other problem or 
matters between them. If it is useful for reaching settlement, parties are at their liberty to 
include in the settlement agreements any terms or matters that they deem appropriate. Such 
terms or matters may be well beyond the scope of the disputes that they bring to mediation 
in the first place. Again, the defense that an arbitral award is beyond the scope of the 
underlying arbitration agreement may have no role to play in the context of enforcement of 
settlement agreements reduced into the form of awards on agreed-terms. That is one of the 
reasons why there should be a speciﬁc instrument and mechanism tailored with mediation 
and settlement agreements in minds. 
II. Mediated settlement agreement
 In the New York Convention, only arbitral awards qualiﬁed as ＂foreign awards＂ 7  can 
enjoy the beneﬁt of the enforcement mechanism under the regime. So, if we are going to 
create an instrument to govern the enforcement of settlement agreement, there should also 
be the proper scope for the regime under the new instrument. An aspect of the scope of 
application is about the type of settlement agreements that can come under the roof of the 
new instrument, because settlement agreements can be done in various contexts. 
 Settlement agreements may be the result of negotiation between disputing parties after 
disputes erupt, without any intervention of a neutral or any third party. Such settlement 
agreements serve the same purpose as any settlement agreement in resolving disputes, and 
substituting the old obligations disputed between the parties with the new obligations 
specified in the new agreements. However, if the new instrument covers all kinds of 
settlement agreements, including those arising from ordinary negotiations, there will be a lot 
of questions about the appropriateness of the new instrument, because, by nature, a 
6 　Supra note ₁, Article V(₁)(c).
7 　Supra note ₁, Article I(₁).
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settlement agreement is still a kind of contracts entered into by parties 8 . Therefore, if there 
is no special necessity, it will be hard to argue why a kind of contract should obtain special 
treatment not given to other kinds of contracts. 
 It is widely accepted that mediation can foster harmonious environment, preserve 
valuable relationship, and give parties power to choose their own terms for resolving 
disputes. There is necessity to promote more use of mediation in resolving disputes. If there 
is no special enforcement mechanism, parties might be reluctant to lean toward mediation, 
and still pursue solution for their disputes by some confrontational means. The new 
instrument should therefore provide for such special enforcement mechanism for settlement 
agreements that are the products of mediation, instead of any kind of settlement agreements. 
Such settlement agreements may be referred to as ＂mediated settlement agreements＂ 9 .
 In practice, there are still several issues that might occur, even though settlement 
agreements are the outcomes of mediation, because very often mediation does not take place 
in isolation from other procedures or processes. Mediation can occur while there are court 
or arbitral proceedings dealing with the very same disputes brought to mediation. Once 
settlement agreements have been reached by parties, they may ask courts or arbitral tribunals 
to record the terms of the settlement as parts of court judgments or arbitral awards. Such 
settlement agreements might be beyond the scope of application of the new instrument10, 
because including such settlement agreements might cause the regime under the new 
instrument to be in conﬂict with other instruments, such as the New York Convention, if the 
settlement agreements become parts of arbitral awards on agreed-terms. If the terms of 
settlement agreements become parts of court judgments, the new instrument may also 
potentially be in conﬂict with the regime for enforcement of foreign judgments, due to the 
different treatment and standard. Including such settlement agreements will also do little in 
8 　Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-second 
session, A/CN.₉/₈₃₂, at p.₈ available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_
groups/₂Arbitration.html.
9 　Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-third session, 
A/CN.₉/₈₆₁, at p.₅ available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_
groups/₂Arbitration.html.
10　Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-forth session, 
A/CN.₉/₈₆₇, at p.₁₉-₂₀ available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_
groups/₂Arbitration.html.
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terms of strengthening their enforceability, because those other regimes or instruments 
already provide for the necessary enforcement mechanism. Moreover, once those settlement 
agreements have become parts of court judgments or arbitral awards, it can also be said that 
their legal status has also been transformed. They are no longer mere settlement agreements. 
They should be treated as any other court judgments or awards. 
III. International commercial disputes
 Another issue closely related to the scope of application is about the types of disputes 
that have been resolved by mediated settlement agreements, and thereby can be enforced 
under the regime of the new instrument. 
 Again, settlement agreements can be used in the resolution of various kinds of disputes, 
as long as parties in those agreements agree to the terms and conditions of the agreements. 
However, several types of disputes may pose different consideration and policy concern. For 
example, if the disputes relate to family matters or family laws, such disputes will inevitably 
touch upon the delicate and sensitive issues when we have to deal with family disputes. 
Therefore, when a foreign court is requested to enforce such settlement agreements, the 
foreign court may have to consider some matters regarding public policy of another state. 
Similar problems will also occur when settlement agreements deal with labor or consumer 
disputes. 
 On the other hand, settlement agreements regarding commercial disputes11 pose little 
difﬁculty, and rarely deal with policy issues, because most countries in international trade, 
more or less, allow for autonomy of parties. So, parties in commercial disputes can agree 
upon any terms and conditions as they think appropriate for their circumstances. Moreover, 
most players in commercial disputes are not the kind of parties whom the opposite parties 
may easily exploit, or trick into unconscionable settlement agreements, unlike those in 
consumer disputes. They have relatively sufﬁcient resources and knowledge to protect their 
own interest. Therefore, the settlement agreements that they once willingly agree upon can 
be readily enforceable. The new instrument dealing commercial disputes can also promote 
11　Supra note ₉, at p.₉.
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transnational trade, by encouraging parties in dispute to utilize mediation more. Mediation 
takes signiﬁcantly less time and resources than arbitration. Hence, parties can go back to 
their normal course of business relationship within shorter period of time, and the ﬂow of 
international trade will not be interrupted much. 
 Another issue relating to the type of disputes is about whether the new instrument 
should cover only disputes with international nature, or it should cover any kind of disputes, 
international and domestic alike. It is tempting to incorporate both kinds of disputes into the 
new regime, because the expansive nature of the instrument may also expand its inﬂuence 
and usability. However, dealing with settlement agreements on domestic disputes may set 
the new instrument on a collision course with domestic laws of various countries, because 
the new instrument will inevitably interfere with domestic contract laws that usually govern 
such settlement agreements. Such laws vary from country to country. It will be unlikely that 
we will be able to ﬁnd a common standard that can accommodate pure domestic concerns 
inherent in contract laws of many countries. Limiting the scope of application of the new 
instrument to disputes with international nature12 can circumvent those matters, and is also 
consistent with its international origin. 
IV. Form of Settlement Agreements
 Among parties in a settlement agreement, they may be well aware of the rights and 
obligations that they agree upon. However, when they want to bring the settlement 
agreement to various countries, and ask courts in those countries to enforce the agreement, 
there have to be some requirement to ensure the existence of such agreement as well as the 
rights and obligations contained therein. That is why form requirement comes into play in 
framing an instrument to establish international enforcement mechanism. 
 The most obvious form requirement is arguably the ＂writing＂ requirement13. If a 
settlement agreement is concluded orally, it will be very difficult for a court, let alone a 
foreign one, to enforce the agreement, because, before the court can do so, there must be an 
12　Supra note ₁₀, at p.₁₅-₁₇.
13　Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-ﬁfth session, A/
CN.₉/₈₉₆, at p.₁₂ available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_
groups/₂Arbitration.html.
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establishment of facts regarding the terms and condition. Such proof will engender 
controversial proceeding vehemently contested by the opposite party. Having a settlement 
agreement reduced into a written form can sidestep such situation, and enable courts in 
various jurisdiction to enforce the agreement with confidence regarding its terms and 
conditions. 
 In today technology-crazed world, we can hardly pass a moment without coming into 
contact with some forms of information technology. The writing requirement whose origin 
predates the information technology must also take into account this modern means of 
transacting14. As adopted in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce15, the 
modern writing requirement must accommodate any means of communication that are 
functionally equivalent to the conventional written form, as long as such means can be used 
for subsequent reference16. 
 A requirement for signature of the parties is almost always attached to the writing 
requirement, in order to demonstrate the approval of the parties concerned. To accommodate 
modern means of communication, such signature requirement must also be ﬂexible enough 
to allow parties to use modern means of communication in ＂signing＂ their documents, as 
long as such means can provide proof of the identity of persons who conclude the 
agreement, and the endorsement of such persons with regard to the terms and conditions of 
the agreement. Therefore, parties should be able to utilize some form of ＂digital signature＂ 
to satisfy of the requirement17. 
 The most difﬁcult part of the form requirement is probably the demonstration that a 
settlement agreement relied upon in the enforcement procedure is actually a product of 
mediation18. Otherwise, it might not be able to enjoy the beneﬁt of the new instrument. The 
difﬁculty arises from the fact that, in practice, there has never be a consistent method for 
providing such proof, because such proof has never been a relevant factor under 
conventional procedure for enforcing settlement agreements. But if we are going to limit the 
14　Supra note ₉, at p.₂₁.
15　UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce ₁₉₉₆.
16　United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts 
₂₀₀₅, Article ₉(₂).
17　UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signature ₂₀₀₁, Article ₆.
18　Supra note ₁₃, at p.₁₃-₁₄.
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scope of application of the new instrument to settlement agreements that are the outcomes 
of mediation, it is inevitable to have some kind of proof. 
 A proposal was made that the relevant mediator must also sign in the settlement 
agreement to indicate his or her involvement in the conclusion of the settlement agreement19. 
Such method might directly show that there is actually the necessary linkage between 
mediation and the settlement agreement. However, in practice in many countries, mediators 
do not sign in settlement agreements, because such participation might inadvertently place 
the mediators into some kind of legal relationship with regard to the settlement agreements, 
and might put the mediator at risk of bearing some kind of liability20, if something wrong 
happens to the settlement agreement. Moreover, although mediators may help parties to 
settle their disputes, at the conclusion of mediation, parties may just be able to agree upon 
principles for their settlement. After that, parties may work out the detail of their agreement 
themselves. In such situation, mediators do not involve in the preparation of the final 
settlement agreements. It will be impractical then to require that mediators affix their 
signatures in settlement agreements. 
 Any requirement demonstrating linkage between mediation and settlement agreements 
should be practical in most instances, so that the requirement will be in line with practices in 
mediation in the real world. Actually, it can take several forms21. For example, it might also 
be possible that parties can just indicate in their settlement agreements that there has been 
mediation relating to the agreement. It is also possible that, instead of having mediators sign 
in settlement agreements, mediators may just attest the existence of mediation in separate 
documents, so that the mediators do not have to directly involve in the settlement 
agreements. These forms should be sufﬁcient to show the necessary linkage. 
V. Defenses
 As mentioned earlier that, under the regime of the New York Convention, its 
cornerstone of success is the coherent, consistent, but limited, grounds for consideration of 
19　Id.
20　Id.
21　Id.
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the courts. Courts may refuse to enforce arbitral awards exclusively on the grounds speciﬁed 
in the convention22. National courts cannot invoke domestic laws to refuse enforcement, 
unless it is the laws that the New York Convention provides as applicable laws for particular 
issues in certain circumstances. The new instrument for enforcement of settlement 
agreements should also proceed along the same model of success, if it is to aspire to achieve 
the same level of worldwide recognition. 
 The main hindrance on this matter is that settlement agreements are, in essence, 
contracts that parties agree upon, just like any other commercial contracts those same parties 
regularly enter into in the course of their business. If we are going to frame the criteria and 
grounds that courts in various jurisdictions have to consider, there is a temptation to 
introduce into the new instrument those defenses that parties may raise to argue against the 
application of ordinary contractual obligations23 in national courts, for example, 
misrepresentation, mistake, coercion, duress, unconscionability etc.  If we were to introduce 
those defenses, the new instrument would not provide any additional benefit, and the 
ensuing procedure will look a lot like ordinary court proceeding. Parties who want to 
enforce settlement agreements still bear a lot of burden of proof. However, doing away with 
those defenses recognized domestically will not create comfort for countries to join the new 
instrument as well, because they might think that their domestic concern is not given due 
regard, and they might stand to lose too many things to warrant participating in the new 
regime. 
 Some of the defenses might be inevitable, regardless of which points of view we take. 
Public policy24 defense will have to be included, because it signiﬁes very important concern 
that countries may have when they come to deal with enforcement of settlement agreements. 
This is one of ﬂexibilities that the new instrument must provide for countries, so that any 
concern they might have will be alleviated. Such defense is also available under the New 
York Convention. However, there might be future arguments regarding the exact meaning of 
the term. Even in the context of arbitration where such term has been used for more than 
22　ICCA＇S GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ₁₉₅₈ NEW YORK CONVENTION: A 
HAND BOOK FOR JUDGES, ₇₈ (Neil Kaplan, ed. International Council for Commercial 
Arbitration ₂₀₁₁).
23　Supra note ₉, at p.₁₆.
24　Id.
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half a century, there are still differing views. Some argue that it should encompass only 
＂international public policy＂, or policy concerns that are accepted internationally, not any 
idiosyncratic concern peculiar to a particular country. Such debate may have to be left for 
future application of the new instrument. 
 Another defense available under the New York Convention is the incapacity of parties 
to settlement agreements. If a party is incapable to enter into a particular settlement 
agreement in the first place, it is logical that such settlement agreement should not be 
enforced under the new regime. On this matter, the laws of the country of such party may 
come into play, because legal capacity of a person should be in accordance with the laws of 
the country of such person. This may include a situation where laws of a country might 
place some restriction on power of some kinds of person, such as state agency or enterprise, 
to enter into this kind of agreement. If there is no specific restriction, even those state 
agencies or enterprises should also be entitled to enjoy the beneﬁts of the new instrument. 
 Itemizing defenses may also be problematic, because they will have to accommodate 
various concerns and criteria. In the New York Convention, there is a similar matter when it 
has to deal with enforcement of arbitration agreements. Under the convention, courts are 
obliged to refer disputes in court proceedings to arbitration, if there is an arbitration 
agreement between the parties in the case. Courts may refuse to refer parties to arbitration 
only if the arbitration agreements are null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed25. Such criteria may be applied to enforcement of settlement agreements as well. 
They can encompass several aspects of the defenses that may occur in national laws, 
because at the end the determination on this matter must be done in the light of relevant 
governing laws. Such criteria can even accommodate situations where settlement 
agreements provide for reciprocal obligations between the parties and the obligation on the 
part of the party requesting for enforcement has not been fulﬁlled. So, it may be considered 
that the enforcement of the obligation of the other party has not yet been capable of being 
enforced. 
 Another proposal that is more problematic is about the due process of mediation and 
the conducts of mediators26. It has been proposed that mediation process should be properly 
25　Supra note ₉, at p.₁₇.
26　Supra note ₁₃, at p. ₁₉.
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conducted to treat all parties fairly, and mediators should not act in such manner that is 
unfair or provide undue favor to one of the parties. Such incident may constitute grounds for 
refusal of enforcement of settlement agreements. The concerns are derived from legal 
proceedings such as court or arbitral proceedings, because when decisions may be made 
against a party, the party must be given proper opportunity to participate in the proceedings, 
defend his or her case, and present arguments and evidence. Once their views and arguments 
have been taken into consideration, any judgment or award may be rendered. 
 Due process and mediators＇ conducts may, however, take different seats in mediation. 
We have to bear in mind that in mediation mediators do not have power or authority to 
decide the disputes, or impose any resolution on parties. Any terms and conditions may be 
vetoed by a party who has full authority to accept any terms or conditions he or she pleases. 
By nature, mediation process must be carried out with participation of all parties. So, they 
are well aware of the ongoing proceeding, and play significant roles in the process. 
Procedure such as caucus meeting with one of the parties is just a means of communication 
and exploring issues and solutions. No matter what mediators say or do, parties can always 
reject or accept. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that there will be any irregularity or 
improper conduct by mediators that may qualify as violation of due process. Including this 
kind of defense may open the door for recalcitrant parties to try to ﬁnd way out of the deals 
they willingly agree upon.
VI. Form of the Instrument
 At the end of all discussions, a salient issue must be ﬁnally determined whether the 
new instrument should take the form of another model law, or a new convention. The issue 
is extremely important because it will directly affect the fate of all efforts that so many 
countries have put into this project.  
 The form of a model law seems attractive to many countries, because it will just give 
them the main idea of how an instrument on enforcement of settlement agreements should 
look like27. It will not oblige countries to do anything. When those countries decide to create 
27　Supra note ₁₃, at p.₂₄. 
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their national laws on enforcement of settlement agreements, they can take a look at the 
model law, and decide for themselves what they want to do with their own laws. So, this 
form can accommodate various concerns that those countries may have, because we have to 
admit that popularity, acceptance and understanding of mediation vary, and differ from 
country to country. In some countries, there is not sufﬁcient trust in the process to warrant a 
special legally-binding instrument on this matter yet. If the instrument takes the form of a 
model law, these countries will be comfortable to accept some provisions or standard that 
they know not legally binding. 
 This project is not the ﬁrst time that the UNCITRAL embarks regarding mediation. In 
₂₀₀₂, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation. The 
model law tries to lay down several principles that may be applicable to mediation, such as 
conﬁdentiality, conduct of conciliation process, admissibility of evidence and information 
arising in the course of mediation. However, one notable absence is the mechanism for 
enforcement of settlement agreements. There is no consensus on this issue, so it was left 
open for countries to decide for themselves what they want to do with the mechanism28. The 
model law has so far received limited success, especially when compared to the model law 
on arbitration. Although countries may adopt and enact their own laws on mediation and 
settlement agreements, the lack of harmonious and consistent standard and criteria for 
enforcement of settlement agreements has hampered the use of mediation. Hence, if the new 
instrument takes the form of another model law, it might not solve the problem that is the 
origin of this project, because at the end there will not be an international mechanism that 
creates binding obligations on countries to enforce settlement agreements, and courts seized 
with requests for enforcement will still apply their national standards that differ from 
country to country29. Parties will not be able to ascertain how they should behave or handle 
their settlement agreements. It might be better for the sake of promoting the use of 
mediation, if the new instrument will be a new convention specifically providing for 
enforcement of settlement agreements. 
28　UNCITRAL Model law on International Commercial Conciliation (₂₀₀₂), Article ₁₄.
29　Supra note ₁₃, at p.₂₄-₂₅.
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VII. Conclusion
 Mediation has vast potential to effectively heal transnational disputes, by providing 
parties with new chances to reconsider solutions that they might overlook, see opportunity 
they cannot ﬁgure out by themselves, and craft their own destiny, not leaving it in the hands 
of outsiders. Currently, parties who go to mediation and painstakingly obtain settlement 
agreements have to disguise their intention by appointing arbitrators to render awards on 
agreed terms to enhance enforceability of the settlement agreements. Otherwise, they have 
to enforce settlement agreements in the same way as other contracts. This deﬁciency causes 
many parties to perceive mediation as an inferior means for dispute settlements, and be 
reluctant to use mediation for their transaction. Hence, if there is a new international 
convention on enforcement of settlement agreements, it will send a strong and unequivocal 
signal to parties in transnational disputes that mediation can be an effective means for 
resolving disputes, and any outcome of the process can be internationally enforced through 
special mechanism that binds courts in contracting countries to apply a single and coherent 
standard and criteria. Such scenario will deﬁnitely help mediation fulﬁll its vast potential 
that we long recognize. 
(Judge, of Ofﬁce of President of the Supreme Court, 
executive of the Thai Arbitration Institute)
